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Abstract 
Exploring the representational effect of tourism, this study examines factors that influence 
perceptions that Chinese outbound tourists are representatives or de facto ambassadors of the 
Chinese government advancing its national objectives abroad. The paper finds that the Chinese 
government is ambivalent, and at times inconsistent about endowing individual tourists with 
the responsibility to serve as its de facto ambassadors. In addition, the paper argues that the role 
of tourism in China’s bilateral relations with South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe influence 
general perceptions among bureaucrats and elites in the three countries that Chinese outbound 
tourists are representatives of the Chinese government.   
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Introduction 
For political elites in select Southern African countries, what does Chinese tourism represent? 
Do they regard Chinese tourists as representatives of the Chinese government, advancing its 
national objectives abroad?3 What is the representational power of Chinese tourists to the 
making of Sino-African people-to-people engagement and foreign policy relations? In general, 
the study of interlink between tourism (and tourists) and a country’s national interests is crucial 
to understanding the ‘instrumentalisation’ of tourism, which increasingly, beyond the revenue 
and tourism statistics, has ‘representational meaning’ in state-to-state relations. This is essential 
because as put by Linda Richter, tourism is generally seen “largely in economic terms, with 
little awareness of its potential political impact” (1989:3). Important to note is that, the 
representational meaning is not universal but contextual and relatable to a country’s national 
interests and foreign policy objectives. It is therefore an idea that is given localized geospatial 
meanings. For instance, in basic terms and based on findings of our empirical research in China 
and Southern Africa, for Beijing, burgeoning outbound tourism represent national rejuvenation 
and realisation of the ‘China Dream’, evoking nationalism and legitimation of the Communist 
Party of China (CPC). The fact that in 2018, Chinese travelers made a total of 149.72 million 
outbound trips, spending over US$120 billion, solidifies the image of a prosperous and 
confident China on path to becoming a ‘moderately prosperous society’. For Zimbabwe, an 
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Approved Destination Status (ADS) and subsequent hosting of Chinese tourists represent its 
burgeoning bilateral relations with Beijing, and its regional competitiveness - proving to the 
West that it has political legitimacy. On the other hand, in Namibia, Chinese tourists represent 
its independence from a historical dominance by South Africa over its tourism industry and 
economy - suggesting its ability to compete with Pretoria for Chinese tourists as an equal-status 
sovereign nation. In sum, the three examples, which are discussed in detail in this paper, imply 
that the same group of Chinese tourists can represent and have different meanings attributed to 
them in relation to a country’s national interests and foreign policy objectives.  
     The representations are, however, the consequences of actors and processes often situated 
outside the contours of the state and its foreign policy making processes. They depend on flows 
of tourists, and their individual and collective behaviour abroad. In addition, perceptions of 
national tourism agencies and other stakeholders in the hospitality industry regarding tourists 
from abroad matter, and feed into production of the representations. Suggesting the critical role 
played by tourism in advancing national objectives and shaping of states’ foreign policies. 
Existing scholarship in International Relations (IR) and foreign policy analysis eschews this 
political and representational role of tourists and tourism, particularly outbound tourism. This 
is because tourism, whether inbound or outbound, has generally been considered too private 
and ad hoc to systematically influence foreign policy or national objectives; or in cases where 
a link is made between tourism and foreign policy, it is regarded as a soft power instrument 
(Kwek, Wang & Weaver, 2013; Tse, 2013; Chen & Duggan, 2016; Xu, Wang & Song, 2018). 
However, the rise of China’s state-driven outbound tourism is demanding a relook on the role 
of tourism in foreign policy. This paper contributes to this critical and emerging debate on the 
instrumentalisation of tourists by states to advance foreign policy objectives. Specifically, it 
explores how and why Chinese outbound tourists have come to be seen in Zimbabwe, South 
Africa and Namibia as representatives or de facto ambassadors of the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC).  
 Notably, there is no lack of impressionistic observations framing Chinese tourists as 
instruments of China’s soft power. For instance, Kwek, Wang and Weaver, by using “analytical 
auto-ethnography to explore the package tour experience of overseas Chinese,” argue that 
China’s “international tourism policies highlight the interdependency between inbound tourism 
growth, economic development and soft power projections” (2013:37). Similarly, Xu, Wang 
and Song maintain that through its ADS scheme, promotion of tourism culture activities abroad, 
use of tourism as a form of foreign aid and strengthening of bilateral tourism cooperation, the 
Chinese government is increasing “China’s soft power through outbound tourism” (2018:6). 




However, there is a dearth of empirically grounded scholarship on the role of tourism, in 
particular, Chinese outbound tourism in Beijing’s foreign policy. In arguing that the Chinese 
state instrumentalises outbound tourism to achieve its national objectives, this paper goes 
beyond the tourism-as-soft-power argument and contributes to the development of empirically-
based research by focusing on Chinese tourism in three Southern African countries; South 
Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe. The three countries were selected for two reasons. Among the 
16 countries in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) - a regional 
organization of countries in the Southern Africa region, the three are among Southern Africa’s 
biggest tourist destinations with the most significant tourist attractions; Kruger National Park 
(South Africa), Victoria Falls (Zimbabwe) and the Namib Desert (Namibia). Between 2009 and 
2017, according to the World Bank, Zimbabwe and South Africa were Southern Africa’s top 
two receivers of international tourists (see table 1 below).  
 Second, although Mozambique and Botswana received more international tourists than 
Namibia, their national tourism boards do not focus on Chinese tourists. Namibia, Zimbabwe 
and South Africa have the ADS, enabling them to market their tourist destinations in China 
and, among the 16 SADC countries, they have had the most significant tourist marketing 
campaigns and have tourism marketing offices in China (Chen & Duggan, 2016). Their 
interaction with Beijing and contact with Chinese tourists make them useful in investigating 
factors influencing perceptions, in the three countries, that Chinese tourists are representatives 
of the Chinese government. 




Country 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 TOTAL 





2 Zimbabwe 2 017 2 239 2 423 1 794 1 833 1 880 2 057 2 168 2 423 18 834 
3 Mozambique 1 461 1 718 1 902 2 113 1 886 1 661 1 552 1 639 1 447 15 379 
4 Botswana 1 721 1 973 .. 1 614 1 544 1 966 1 528 1 574 .. 11 920 








Country 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 TOTAL 
5 Namibia 980 984 1 027 1,079 1 176 1 320 1 388 1 469 1 499 10 922 
6 Mauritius 871 935 965 965 993 1 038 1 151 1 275 1 342 9 535 
7 Tanzania 695 754 843 1,043 1 063 1 113 1 104 1 233 1 275 9 123 
8 Eswatini 908 868 879 888 968 939 873 947 921 8 191 
9 Zambia 710 815 920 859 915 947 932 956 1 083 8 137 
10 Malawi 755 746 767 770 795 819 805 849 837 7 143 
11 Lesotho 344 426 398 423 433 1 079 1 082 1 196 1 137 6 518 
12 Angola 366 425 481 528 650 595 592 397 261 4 295 
13 Seychelles 158 175 194 208 230 233 276 303 350 2 127 
14 Madagascar 163 196 225 256 196 222 244 293 255 2 050 
15 Congo, Dem. 
Rep. 
53 81 186 167 191 334 354 351 .. 1 717 
16 Comoros 11.3 15.3 18.8 22.8 21.9 22.8 23.6 26.8 28 191.3 
Source: World Bank 
 
 Considering that the three countries have the most elaborate campaigns to attract 
Chinese tourists (Kromberg, 2014; Chen & Duggan, 2016), we selected them to examine 
whether they regarded Chinese tourists to be representatives of the Chinese government , able 
to advance its foreign policy objectives in the countries. Furthermore, we explore whether the 
Chinese government regard Chinese tourists as its representatives abroad. In investigating these 
issues, we argue that the representation of tourism in China’s bilateral relations with the three 
Southern African countries influence perceptions that Chinese outbound tourists are agents of 




the Chinese government. This argument is based on findings deduced from expert interviews 
we conducted in China and the three countries. Details of the interviews and the sensitivity of 
conducting research on China in the three countries is discussed in the next section. The sections 
that follow analyse the incorporation of Chinese tourists into Beijing’s foreign policy processes; 
the instrumentalisation of Chinese outbound tourists and factors influencing perceptions that 
Chinese tourists are representatives of Beijing. The conclusion sums up the main implications. 
Researching Chinese tourism in Southern Africa: the tourists, elites and the sensitivities  
Research on China related matters in Africa is often problematic due to the secretive nature of 
some African governments’ engagement with China (Asongu & Aminkeng, 2013:12). From 
our experience, even the seemingly ‘politically unencumbered’ subject of Chinese outbound 
tourism is considered sensitive by some government officials in Zimbabwe, South Africa and 
Namibia making access to information on the subject a challenge for researchers. At the same 
time, Chinese tourists in group tours, such as the ones we encountered in Namibia, South Africa 
and Zimbabwe simply have too strict and heavy-laden itineraries to spare a moment for an 
interview. For instance, the two groups that we managed to informally engage with were 
seemingly uncomfortable discussing in public whether they represented the Chinese 
government’s national interests in their touristic activities. The sensitivity and discomfort of 
both the government officials and Chinese tourists suggest, in some respects, the political and 
diplomatic signification of Chinese outbound tourism to Africa.  
 Regardless, in examining why the three Southern African countries regard Chinese 
tourists as representatives of China, it seemed prudent to focus on experts and policy-
implementers. This is because our focus was to examine perceptions of national tourism 
agencies, who have a mandate to market their countries as tourist destinations in China; and 
actors in the hospitality industry, who host Chinese tourists. Yet, accessing these experts in 
Zimbabwe, China, South Africa and Namibia proved to be challenging, but surmountable 
because of gatekeepers who required convincing about the academic objectives of the research. 
Inevitably, there were several last-minute cancellations because some high-level government 
officials withdrew their consent to being interviewed. For example, an official in a local 
governmental tourist agency in Cape Town, South Africa cancelled a confirmed interview 
appointment without explanation and stopped responding to emails. Accordingly, negotiating 
for an audience with the experts and/or their gatekeepers constituted an integral part of our 
research preparation.  
 Regardless, our research was guided by qualitative approaches, and data collected 




between June and October 2017 in Windhoek, Cape Town, Johannesburg, Pretoria, Victoria 
Falls, Harare and Beijing. The main sources of data were key informant interviewees selected 
for their expertise in Chinese tourism as well as their strategic and professional positions in 
government, national tourism agencies, the hospitality industry and tour agencies. In sum, 
respondents to our face-to-face, semi-structured qualitative interviews can be categorised into 
four distinct but interdependent tourism stakeholders. (1) Policymakers and implementers; 
directors in ministries responsible for tourism and directors at national tourism boards. (2) 
Tourism service providers; tourism agencies bringing Chinese tourists to the three African 
countries, hoteliers and hospitality associations. That is, umbrella bodies representing the 
interests of private hotels and actors in the hospitality industry. (3) Chinese tourists in tour 
groups in South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia. (4) Academic experts on tourism and China’s 
foreign policy.  
 To get an understanding of the PRC’s foreign policy objectives regarding Chinese out-
bound tourists, we interviewed academics specialising in tourism and the foreign policy of 
China at the Renmin University of China, Peking University, Tsinghua University and the Chi-
nese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). In Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa, interview-
ing directors at the Namibia Tourism Board (NTB), the Zimbabwe Tourism Authority (ZTA) 
and the Department of Tourism in South Africa enabled us to expand our access in the field. 
The officials we interviewed pointed us to potential interviewees. As noted by Alexander 
Bogner, Beate Littig and Wolfgang Menz, when targeted experts who hold key positions in 
their organisations are willing to participate, they present: “opportunities for expanding the re-
searcher’s access to the field […] and indicate additional potential interviewees with expertise 
in a particular field during the interview itself ” (2009: 2). For instance, in Zimbabwe, a high-
level official at the ZTA instructed a junior manager to give us access to statistical data that the 
junior manager had previously refused to give us access to. In Namibia, an official at the Hos-
pitality Association of Namibia drove us to places where we could meet tour groups of Chinese 
tourists and referred us to other potential interviewees. However, to reduce the homogeneity of 
informants’ views and voices in snowball sampling, multiple initial contact points representing 
a maximum variation were accessed.  
 Nonetheless, considering the sensitivity of China-related issues in the three countries, 
expert interviews proved to be a difficult but effective means of obtaining critical data that 
would have been impossible to get without the support of the experts we interviewed. In our 
case, the expert interviews shortened ‘time-consuming data gathering processes [because we 
regarded] the experts as ‘crystallization points for practical insider knowledge” and we 




interviewed them “as surrogates for a wider circle of players” (Bogner, Littig and Menz, 2009: 
2). Accordingly, we gained extensive access to reports and statements on outbound Chinese 
tourism issued by the governments of Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe that were not easily 
accessible to the public. For example, we were given access to a Memorandum of 
Understanding signed by China and one of the three countries on the promotion of tourism 
between the two countries. 
 In sum, we interviewed more than ten expert informants in South Africa, Namibia, 
Zimbabwe and China. Three respondents were heads of national tourism agencies in 
Zimbabwe, South Africa and Namibia. One was a director of tourism in South Africa’s 
Department of Tourism. Two Chinese tour companies in Windhoek and Cape Town were 
interviewed. Three other informants work in the tourism industry as hotel front-of-house staff 
and in hospitality associations in the three countries. In Johannesburg, we interviewed a hotel 
staff member who participated in a public-private partnership initiative to instruct hotel staff in 
Mandarin and Chinese culture. In Windhoek, we interviewed, the head of the Hospitality 
Association of Namibia and in Victoria Falls we interviewed a hotel porter at the Kingdom 
Hotel. One of the informants is a traditional chief in Victoria Falls. In Beijing, we interviewed 
academics working on Chinese foreign policy and soft power strategies at the Renmin 
University of China, Tsinghua University, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and Peking 
University. To ensure a holistic view of how China and the Chinese in general are perceived in 
African countries, brief interviews with locals and Confucius Institute staff at the University of 
Zimbabwe were also conducted, lasting between 10 and 30 minutes. They offered 
supplementary information for our analysis. The following sections discuss main factors 
contributing to general perceptions that the Chinese state regards its outbound tourists as its 
representatives. 
Historical analysis of the development of tourism in China 
China’s historical and political development since 1949 has led to the state playing a dominant 
role in tourism, controlling both domestic and international travel by Chinese nationals. Thus, 
tourism was regarded as both a political and strategic foreign policy matter such that, until 1978 
the Bureau of Travel and Tourism (BTT), which managed travel agencies in the country was 
directly under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs rather than the State Council. Yet, even with the 
China National Tourism Administration (CNTA), the agency in charge of tourism now squarely 
under the State Council, the government continues to play a leading role in directing China’s 
tourism policy, developing the tourism industry and instituting domestic and foreign policies 




that subtly influence travel patterns of Chinese tourists. Wooyeal Paik (2019) concurs that the 
Chinese government maintained, and still maintains a stringent control over these tourists and 
the tourism industry. 
  Prior to China’s opening up, people-to-people exchange through tourism had a strong 
emphasis on fostering relationships with then allied countries, such as the Soviet Union and 
regions like Eastern Europe. The policy was favoured because of “both its long-run economic 
prospects and the immediate political goodwill and publicity the new hospitality may garner” 
(Richter, 1989:5). The trend was however, broken by dramatic domestic ruptures like the 
Cultural Revolution and the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident leading to a decline in inbound 
and outbound tourism (Uysal, Wei & Reid, 1986). At that time, outbound tourism was only 
limited to state-sanctioned tours, state visits and business travels. There was no self-paying 
ordinary Chinese. Deng Xiaoping’s economic reform era was also a turning point because 
tourism began to be presented as a tool for economic development and source of foreign 
currency. From then on, tourism assumed a dual economic and politico-diplomatic role leading 
some scholars to describe it as “tourism with Chinese characteristics” (Zhang, King and Ap, 
1999). 
 Despite the domestic and international implications of the Cultural Revolution and 
Tiananmen, China did not stop developing its inbound tourism industry through the use of 
various financial incentives and gradually opening up to outbound tourism. Linking inbound 
tourism to its diplomatic objectives, Beijing invited foreign dignitaries, students, and elites to 
visit China. The underlying logic was that these visits would increase foreign guests’ 
acceptance of China, both culturally and politically, fostering mutual understanding and 
friendship. Despite warnings to the Chinese government by both Western and Chinese scholars 
that “to know us” does not mean “to love us” (Rawnsley, 2015), the government continues to 
invite and sponsor foreigners to visit China in an attempt to use tourism as a soft power tool to 
advance its national interest. Thus, as tourism’s role in economic development grows, its 
political and foreign policy functions are being consolidated, making Chinese outbound tourism 
a diplomatic tool for Beijing (Tse, 2013; Chen & Duggan, 2016).  
 One of the elaborate ways that Beijing influences the traveling patterns of Chinese 
outbound tourists is by imposing tourist bans as a sanctioning tool against countries that happen 
to offend the PRC. For example, in 2018, China barred its citizens from visiting the Pacific 
island nation of Palau as a sanction for its diplomatic links with Taiwan. The ban significantly 
affected Palau’s tourism-dependent economy because China is the country’s largest tourism 
market. “Chinese tourists accounted for 47 per cent of international visitors to Palau in 2016, 




with Taiwan making up 10 per cent” (South China Morning Post, 2018). In 2017, South Korean 
government said that “it had learned that Chinese authorities summoned representatives of 
travel agencies in Beijing […] and instructed them to stop selling South Korean tours” (Mullen, 
2017). The ‘tourism sanction’ was in retaliation to South Korea’s decision to host the THAAD 
missile defense system.  
In the month after the THAAD launch, South Korea saw a sudden 40 percent plunge in 
Chinese tourists – who, previously, accounted for nearly 50 percent of all arrivals into the 
country (Coca, 2018).  
 This imposition of a ‘tourism sanction’ and the historical development of Chinese 
outbound tourism aid perceptions of interlink between tourism and China’s national objectives 
as espoused by the Communist Party of China.  
 Another approach that Beijing has used is to support tourism to certain strategically 
important countries or areas. Tse’s study (2013) gives ample examples such as encouragement 
of Mainland Chinese to visit the Special Administrative Regions (SAR) of Hong Kong and 
Macau to help boost their economies as a sign of the motherland’s good will towards the two 
regions. It is also not a coincidence that China heavily encouraged Chinese tourists to Southeast 
Asian countries after they were devastated by the tsunami in 2004 as a way of adding credibility 
to China’s diplomatic discourse that it is benevolent to its neighboring countries (Tse, 2013). 
 The tradition of seeing tourism as a key component of people-to-people exchange that 
has been in existence even before the Cultural Revolution remains, suggesting that tourism 
continues to be “an important part of the country’s diplomatic strategy [and] plays an active 
part in international relations and cooperation with other countries” (Zhang, 2016: 33-34). As 
further put by Wooyeal Paik, “the political dimension to Chinese outbound tourism expands 
and results in more political relations in a host country’s local, national, and international 
contexts” (2019:2). What is missing, however in the discussion of Chinese tourism as a tool for 
achieving economic, political and foreign policy objectives, is the role of Chinese outbound 
tourists. To date, there has been no significant inquiry on whether Chinese outbound tourists 
are indeed acting as unofficial representatives of the PRC in the countries that they travel to. 
Unless there is a nuanced understanding of the role that Chinese tourists play in advancing 
‘perceived’ Beijing’s foreign policy objectives, assertions that China is using tourism as a 
diplomatic tool and soft power strategy remain abstract and unsubstantiated.  
Demand for tourists to advance China’s national objectives 
Socio-economic transformations in China increased the financial capacity of previously 
disadvantaged Chinese to travel abroad. McKinsey reported in 2018 that from 2010 to 2015, 




the number of outbound trips from China more than doubled, growing at a Compound Annual 
Growth Rate (CAGR) of 15 percent (Dichter et al., 2018:4). In addition, the growth was 
necessitated by alteration of visa restrictions for Chinese tourists by approximately 66 
countries. As more of them travel to Asia, Africa, Europe and the Americas, their general 
interest in exotic parts of the world, and taste for experiencing the outside world has grown. In 
light of these developments, to the Chinese government, outbound tourism demonstrates the 
prosperity of Chinese nationals and the economic power of China to the world (Arlt, 2016). 
Beijing has even designated tourism a strategic area of national interest, and therefore an 
enabler and expression of the China Dream and national rejuvenation. Accordingly, China’s 
“new tourism-related regulations and policies and strategic interests’ are geared towards 
‘building its ‘soft power’ through outbound tourism” (Li, 2016: xxvii). But while there seem to 
be consensus among Chinese academics and government officials that outbound tourism can 
be of service to China’s national interests and foreign policy objectives (Tang, 2014; Hu, 2009), 
there is disagreement over the actual role that outbound Chinese tourists should and are playing.  
 Chinese scholars often discuss the role of Chinese tourists in Beijing’s foreign policy. 
Their approach is usually more normative and ideological, urging China to advance its soft 
power via outbound tourism. As China’s tourism industry grows from domestic tourism to 
inbound tourism and then outbound tourism, more and more PRC foreign policy scholars are 
beginning to elaborate on their expectation for Chinese outbound tourism to serve the country’s 
political interests (Hollinshead & Hou, 2012; Tse, 2013; Chen & Duggan, 2016). However, 
they tend to take an economic rather than international politics perspective. That means, articles 
on this topic are usually published in business-oriented and general social science journals. On 
the other hand, articles published in Western journals (even when published by Chinese 
authors) tend to eschew normative discussions. Instead, there is a tendency to describe Chinese 
outbound tourism as being ‘tourism with Chinese characteristics’ with suggestions that its 
service to politics has historical roots and continues to be directed by the Chinese state. 
 Nonetheless, in China’s tourism legislation and policies, there is no clear mention of 
Chinese tourists being ‘unofficial ambassadors’ or representatives of China. Liu Haifang, a 
professor at Peking University argues that the “Chinese government has not embraced tourists 
as citizen ambassadors yet. It may take some time before the Chinese government might get 
this perspective. My reason is, I don't see any of this type of efforts to prepare tourists”.4 To 
Liu Haifang, unless the Chinese government recognises outbound tourists as citizen 
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ambassadors and prepares them to act as ambassadors, even in the cultural sense, they will not 
be such. This is understandable, because considering the nature of the Chinese state, and its 
penchant to regulate and control global perceptions about its image, the Chinese government 
may not be keen on officially designating Chinese outbound tourists as citizen ambassadors 
without a clear plan on how the messaging will be standardised and regulated. This however, 
does not mean that if they are not de jure citizen ambassadors they cannot be de facto citizen 
ambassadors.  
 Chinese outbound tourists are, in fact, de facto representatives of China, its culture, 
ideals and interests abroad. References to Chinese tourists as representatives of China can be 
inferred from speeches by senior government officials. Speaking to members of the Western 
Returned Scholars Association in October 2013, Xi Jinping urged Chinese citizens abroad to  
Act as unofficial ambassadors to promote people-to-people friendship, and explain 
China’s culture, history and points of view in such a way that people from other countries 
can understand and identify with China, and be ready to give it greater appreciation and 
support (Xi, 2017:66)  
           Although the speech was not directed to outbound Chinese tourists, generic references 
to Chinese abroad can be interpreted as inclusive of the tourists. A renowned scholar at CASS 
argued that although Chinese tourists are not regarded by the government as its representatives, 
they have a duty to promote a positive image of China abroad.5 This is however at odds with a 
statement issued by China’s Ministry of Culture and Tourism calling on Chinese tourists to 
behave properly because “when abroad, every tourist represents their home country” (Xinhua, 
2019). Vice Premier Wang Yang also noted at National Tourism Law conference that “some 
tourists don’t obey public rules while traveling and are hampering our national image” (Chang, 
2013). By linking Chinese tourists’ behaviour abroad with the national image and regarding 
them as representing the country, Chinese officials are imputing obligations and duties on 
Chinese tourists to act as its representatives. The implication is that outbound Chinese tourists 
are regarded as de facto representatives of China and are expected to conduct themselves in a 
manner that does not tarnish the image of China. 
 Related to the above is the imposition of fines and other forms of punishment by the 
Chinese government on Chinese tourists that behave badly when abroad. In 2013, China’s 
National Tourism Administration published a ‘Guide to Civilized Tourism and Travel’. The 
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fines and punishments accompanying the guide are aimed at compelling Chinese tourists to act 
in a manner that does not bring the reputation of China into disrepute. This is because the ‘bad 
behaviour’ of Chinese outbound tourists is regarded by Chinese officials as tarnishing the image 
of China, thus imputing representation responsibilities on Chinese outbound tourists 
(Waldmeir, 2015). Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Yesui succinctly put it: 
 The uncivilised behaviour of some Chinese tourists abroad, including talking loudly in 
public places and carving characters on cultural relics, has seriously harmed the country’s 
image while annoying local residents  (Zheng, 2013).  
 The fact that tourists’ misbehaviour attracts high-level government attention and action 
shows that the Chinese government realises that Chinese tourists are, in a way, China’s ambas-
sadors. Accordingly, the official line seems to be that “the way Chinese tourists behave while 
overseas will affect the international image of China being a country of courteous and good 
manner” (Tse & Hobson, 2008:150). In addition to government sanction, there is increased 
citizen-led shaming of tourists that tarnish the image of China by behaving badly abroad. The 
naming and shamings mostly done by ordinary Chinese citizens on Weibo and other social 
networking sites, because there is a growing awareness, driven by nationalism and patriotism, 
that Chinese people represent China abroad, even as tourists. Jiang Chang, a professor in the 
School of Journalism and Communication at Tsinghua University noted in an interview that 
“Chinese nationals oversee the behaviour of Chinese tourists by criticising and shaming tourists 
that tarnish the image of China by behaving badly abroad.”6  
 The sentiments of Chinese nationals on social networking sites are similar to those of 
the Chinese tourists that we interviewed in Cape Town. A Chinese tour operator based in Cape 
Town, whose company has organised several high-level Chinese tours to South Africa 
confirmed that although Chinese tourists are not official representatives of the Chinese 
government with a specific mandate to advance Beijing’s foreign policy objectives, they do so 
out of their own volition. He asserted that “Chinese tourists are very patriotic and have a great 
sense of nationalism […] so they will not act against Chinese interests.”7  
 The factors raised above, more-so, attempts by the Chinese government to control the 
behaviour of Chinese tourists mean that there is no optimal distance between itself and the 
Chinese outbound tourists. The implication is that it has created the impression in Zimbabwe, 
Namibia and South Africa that Chinese tourists are representatives of China. Similarly, in 
China, over the past five years, there has also been a growing realisation among government 
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officials that Chinese tourists should be regarded as representatives of the Chinese people in 
countries they visit. Notably, this is because of the ‘bad behaviour’ of some Chinese tourists is 
directly imputed on all Chinese people. For instance, an official at the Hospitality Association 
of Namibia suggested that hotels and lodges in Namibia were not keen on taking in Chinese 
tourists because they left restaurants and hotel rooms messy.8 An official in the Namibia 
Tourism Board suggested that “even though Chinese tourists in Namibia may not be regarded 
as official representatives of China, Namibians will come to know China and form perceptions 
of the Chinese and the PRC based on the behaviour of the Chinese tourists.”9 
 Perceptions of the representativeness of Chinese tourists are also fueled by media 
reports in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. Suggesting, as in the case of poaching, that 
Chinese tourists are mostly involved in illicit ivory and rhino horn trading as well as poaching. 
In 2016, the Namibian Chamber of Environment, on behalf of 40 Namibian environmental 
organisations delivered an open letter to the Chinese embassy in Windhoek, which was also 
published in the newspaper, The Namibian complaining about  
ongoing commercial wildlife and ecological crimes committed by Chinese national in 
Namibia [and] the apparent lack of action being taken by the Chinese embassy in Namibia 
and the Chinese state to put to a stop the unlawful actions of their nationals (Brown, 2017)  
 Of importance to our discussion is the link that the Namibian Chamber of Environment 
made between the alleged Chinese nationals and the Chinese state. They stated in the letter that: 
We do not claim to fully understand the relationship between Chinese nationals and the 
Chinese state. It appears that Chinese nationals are not at liberty to obtain passports and 
travel independently around the world, bringing their personal capital and starting 
businesses in their own names in whatever country would have them, independent of the 
Chinese state. As such Chinese nationals in Namibia appear to be part of state-supported 
system (Brown, 2017)  
 According to an official at the Namibia Tourism Board, Xin Shunkang, the Chinese 
Ambassador to Namibia was forced to convene meetings with the press and residents to dispel 
perceptions that all Chinese were poachers working with Beijing’s tacit approval. However, 
even though the Chinese government does not consider Chinese tourists as its official 
representatives, there seem to be a realization outside and within China that they ‘unofficially’ 
represent China and the Chinese people.  
Instrumentalisation of tourism 
The Chinese government frames outbound tourism to developing countries as a public good; a 
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form of Beijing’s contribution to their economic development, showing that both outbound and 
inbound tourism are soft power advancement tools (Kwek, Wang & Weave, 2014; Guo, Li & 
Wang, 2014; Stumpf & Swanger, 2015; Weaver, 2015). Such framings are aimed at fostering 
the identity of China as a benevolent global power, whose economic growth is not a threat but 
an opportunity for all countries. Yet, to fully benefit from Chinese outbound tourism, countries 
must be granted the ADS, which is based on their bilateral relations with China. The combined 
effect of the ADS as an inclusionary-exclusionary tool and framing of Chinese tourists as an 
integral part of Beijing’s development assistance strategy supposes a subtle instrumentalisation 
of outbound tourism by China. The effect is that the ADS is a geoeconomic instrument that 
China uses to expand its influence abroad under the guise of promoting people-to-people 
exchange (Hollinshead & Hou, 2012; Tse, 2013; Chen & Duggan, 2016). Furthermore, other 
studies have shown how the Chinese government uses ADS to influence the international 
policies “by co-opting nations into activities pertaining to their agenda” (Xu, Wang & Song 
2018: 7). 
 The instrumentalisation of outbound tourism for national interest and foreign policy 
ends is reflected by the eligibility criteria that countries must meet before they are granted ADS. 
The eligibility requirement was raised by China when it urged more eligible African countries 
to apply for the ADS to increase their inflows of Chinese tourists. In making the decision 
whether to grant ADS, the Chinese government, through the CNTA considers, among other 
factors, a country’s diplomatic relations with China and the country’s adherence to the One-
China Principle.10 As diplomatic ties with China are a pre-requisite to being designated an ADS, 
Taiwan’s last diplomatic partner in Africa, the Kingdom of Eswatini, may never have the ADS 
because “China has not hesitated to use ADS awards as ‘soft power’ tactics to gain political 
advantage in international affairs. No country that politically recognises Taiwan has received 
ADS, even though China granted ADS to Taiwan itself in 2008” (Bonham & Mak, 2014). The 
implication is that Taiwan’s diplomatic partners in Africa and elsewhere are excluded from 
state-driven ‘tourism for development’ initiatives such as China’s “plans to send 150 million 
travellers to countries along the One Belt, One Road in the next five years” (Dasgupta, 2016) 
that Li Jinzao, head of the CNTA announced in 2016. Thus, although not explicit, tourism and 
the ADS are aimed at enhancing China’s national interests abroad.  
 
10 .Other criteria include hosting countries’ tourism amenities, safety, easy access to transportation, 
and guarantee for reciprocity, meaning that visitors from African countries to China should also in-
crease when the number of Chinese tourists to African countries increases (Kim, Guo, & Argusa, 
2005). 




 In China’s relations with Africa, tourism is among areas given priority in promoting 
mutually beneficial cooperation. In that respect, it has two major objectives. First, to promote 
bilateral relations through people-to-people exchange, and secondly to enhance economic 
growth in African countries as part of China’s economic development programs for Africa. 
These two objectives were first set at the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) 
Ministerial Conference held in Beijing from 10 to 12 October 2000. Ministers from China and 
Africa declared that “tourism is an important economic activity which has potential for 
generating financial resources that will help Africa’s accelerated economic growth, the creation 
of employment and the alleviation of poverty” (FOCAC, 2015a). The declaration was further 
emphasised at the 2015 Johannesburg Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation 
where both African countries and China agreed to use tourism to deepen “understanding and 
friendship between the peoples of China and Africa” (FOCAC, 2015a). They then pledged to 
“continue to facilitate travels by their nationals between China and Africa and promote 
activities in each other’s countries and regions” (FOCAC, 2015b). 
    A few months after the FOCAC summit in Johannesburg, China hosted the first World 
Conference on ‘Tourism for Development’ held on 16 May 2016 in Beijing. In that conference, 
Premier Li Keqiang described tourism as “the new driver of economic growth in China” in 
addition to being “the most direct and natural way of people-to-people exchange” that “holds 
the key to state-to-state relations” (The State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2016). 
The result is that in the past two decades, a narrative of tourism as a tool for enhancing bilateral 
relations and enabling Africa’s economic development has taken root, making Chinese 
outbound tourism to Africa a state-driven rather than a people-driven matter. An official in the 
Department of Tourism in South Africa argued that because tourism is part of China’s bilateral 
engagements with South Africa, their focus on Chinese tourists is aimed at strengthening 
diplomatic ties with Beijing and open doors for other forms of bilateral engagement. It therefore 
seems that how many Chinese tourists visit a country has become a measure of the bilateral 
relations between that country and China.  
 Similarly, an official at the Zimbabwe Tourism Authority argued that in focusing on the 
Chinese tourists, the government of Zimbabwe sought to strengthen its bilateral relations with 
Beijing, while sending a message to the West, which has designated Zimbabwe a pariah state, 
that it has political legitimacy. Chinese tourists were therefore accorded special treatment that 
was not given to tourists from other countries. Along the same lines, an official at the Namibia 
Tourism Board asserted that besides using Chinese tourists to bolster bilateral relations with 
China, Namibia sought to assert its independence from South Africa, which regarded itself the 




leaders of tourism in the region. Accordingly, Chinese tourists represented not just revenue, but 
state-to-state relations, compelling governments in the three African countries to regard them 
as ‘unofficial’ representatives of the Chinese government. 
 
Perceived preferential treatment of Chinese tourists  
In Zimbabwe and South Africa perceptions that Chinese tourists are representatives of the 
Chinese government are not just based on their individual or collective behaviour but on the 
preferential treatment they allegedly get from the Zimbabwean and South African government. 
Although none of our interviewees in both countries could specify the forms that the 
preferential treatment took, they were adamant that the police and immigration officers treated 
the Chinese better although China is not even their biggest market at all.11 Part of the reason as 
put by an official at the Zimbabwe Tourism Authority is that there was an impression that 
Chinese tourists had to be treated better because the Zimbabwean government did not want 
anything to happen to them that could jeopardise its bilateral relations with China.12 In South 
Africa and Namibia, government officials made the same assertions, arguing that their focus on 
the Chinese tourism market was state-driven rather than market-driven. The effect is that 
Chinese tourists were regarded as representing the broader interests of both China and each of 
the three Southern African countries hence they were ‘representatives’ of the PRC. 
 In addition, the intervention by government officials in criminal matters involving 
Chinese tourists contributed to perceptions that the tourists represented China. In all three 
countries, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa, some Chinese on tourist visas were arrested 
for attempting to smuggle ivory or rhino horns. The cases were reported in local media in a 
manner that suggested the accused Chinese persons were representative of all the Chinese 
nationals. While in Namibia the Chinese ambassador issued a statement arguing that the 
arrested Chinese were not representative of the Chinese government or the Chinese people. In 
Zimbabwe, some government officials attempted to assist the arrested Chinese to evade justice. 
This fueled notions that the arrested Chinese were officials or representatives of the Chinese 
government. Accordingly, based on their association with government officials in Zimbabwe, 
 
11In 2016, 117 144 Chinese tourists visited South Africa making the 6th largest source of tourists. The 
highest number of tourists to South Africa came from the United Kingdom (447 840), the United States 
(345 013), Germany (311 832), France (154 226) and the Netherlands (147 973). In comparison, only 9 
164 Chinese tourists visited Zimbabwe, making them Zimbabwe’s tenth largest source of tourists, way 
behind other countries from Asia, such as Japan (22 566) and South Korea (12 956). In Namibia, Chinese 
tourists (9 722) were not even in the country’s top ten tourists market. 
12Interview in Harare, Zimbabwe, 30 June 2017. 




some Chinese on tourist visas are regarded by locals as representatives of China. In sum, there 
is a strong perception even among officials in government that the Chinese tourists were 
representative of the Chinese government in that any harm on them would result in a break-up 
of diplomatic relations with China hence, in their view, they ought to be treated well to avoid 
complicating their countries’ diplomatic relations with China. 
Conclusion 
As states scramble for a share of China’s outbound tourism, Zimbabwe, South Africa and 
Namibia are leveraging on their diplomatic, economic and political relations with Beijing. In 
the process, they are imputing representative responsibilities on Chinese tourists. What is also 
emerging from our research is that Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa are also using Chinese 
outbound tourism to achieve their foreign policy objectives, particularly enhancing their 
bilateral relations with China. The distinctive importance of Chinese outbound tourism to 
bilateral relations between China and Africa was confirmed by interviewees at the NTB, ZTA 
and the South African Department of Tourism. The officials at the three institutions suggested 
that the push to attract more Chinese tourists was an executive decision taken by the respective 
countries’ political leadership. Both the Chinese government and governments of South Africa, 
Namibia and Zimbabwe are pushing for Chinese tourists as a tool for enhancing bilateral 
relations, making Chinese tourists a function of international relations and politics.  As part of 
the people-to-people exchange, Chinese tourism to the three countries complements traditional 
and formal diplomacy. It has significant impact on relations between nations. 
 Accordingly, the Chinese government and Chinese outbound tourists in Zimbabwe, 
South Africa and Namibia have an implied principal-agent relationship. The Chinese 
government recognise the implications of badly behaved outbound tourists on its international 
image, hence it expects Chinese outbound tourists to represent China well. On the other hand, 
through a combination of patriotism, government sanction on bad behaviour, naming and 
shaming by fellow Chinese citizens, and perceptions of their representativeness in host 
countries, Chinese tourists in South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia assume the role of de facto 
representatives of China. Beyond the conduct of Chinese outbound tourists, the use of tourism 
by the Chinese government to expand bilateral and diplomatic ties with African countries and 
the exclusion of other countries from the ADS scheme create impressions that Chinese 
outbound tourists are China’s soft power agents. Furthermore, the narrative of tourism as an 
instrument for achieving economic development and enhancing state-to-state relations add to 
the impression that Chinese tourism to Africa is more state-driven and aimed at achieving 
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